INTRODUCTION
Contemporary immigration to Greece has started some decades ago, although the decisive increase in immigrants' numbers occurred in the early 1990s. The first transnational immigrants arrived in the mid 1970s, and, although immigration continues to be considered as a more or less recent phenomenon, Albanian children, who have actually never lived outside Greece, are now very close to their adulthood. Maybe due to this misapprehension, the Greek state was not able untill recently to define a consistent and integrated migratory policy (Marvakis, 2004; Christopoulos, 2004; Kandylis, 2005) . Today, when the first elements of a policy in this field have started to compose the basic outline of a policy frame, the ephemeral character of the migratory movement and the immigrants' short term presence in the Greek social system continue to be dominant assumptions in many public discourses.
However, immigrants in Greece, and particularly immigrants in Greek cities, already participate in the urban space (re)production process. They dwell, they work, they move, they consume, they rent, they reconstruct, they provide domestic services, they fill the voids, they occupy public spaces and attach new meanings to them, they participate in the production of new settlements, they alter the maps of everyday movements, they establish new networks, they thicken the old ones, they begin to challenge urban space as a field of necessities, obligations and rights.
The unplanned massive arrival of new population to the Greek cities is not an unprecedented phenomenon in the modern history of Greece. During the 20th century the process of Greek urbanization was in fact determined by two major migratory waves:
i. The arrival of refugees from Asia Minor in the '20s, after the end of World War I and the Lausanne Treaty, where a population exchange between Greece and Turkey was agreed. About 1.3 ml people of "Greek origin" 1 have replaced a relatively smaller number of the leaving muslims. Some 600,000 settled in urban areas, either immediately or gradually (Voivonda et al., 1977) . ii. The rural exodus in the first post-World War II decades, one of the two massive migratory movements of that period (the other being the emigration of Greeks towards the rapidly developing countries of Western Europe). Net internal migration between 1956-61 and 1966-71 amounted to 212.300 and 250.600 individuals respectively (Athanassiou, 1986: 79) , and then declined since the mid-1970s. Even in terms of "pure" demographic data, the new transnational immigration shows certain important similarities to the two previous cases (i.e. the extent of the movement, and the large presence of young age groups of both sexes). However, these quantitative similarities are insufficient to establish a comparative context for the study of the three waves of immigration and of their impact on urbanization. The basis of comparison lays on the common geographical context, that of Greek cities that were urbanized through subsequent migrations of different population groups, in what can be regarded as a path-dependent (and thus) historical socio-spatial process.
Every period of immigration can be regarded as a context of possibilities and restrictions in which the terms of immigrants' integration and their life courses in their new city are shaped, together with their identities (McCrone, 1998) . This context turns into a precondition for further urbanization, as new residents become producers of new urban space and/or participate in the transformation of the existing city. In the Greek urban environment, the relative significance of immigrants' participation is amplified by the limited development of formal planning. Struggling for their position in the new society and the organization of their everyday lives, immigrants redefine their expectations and then city space, through practices and procedures that they often invent, in a context that frequently appears to be empty of formal active political intervention, either at the national or the local scale.
Choosing from the whole range of factors that define the relation between immigrants and the city, this paper aims at discussing one of its "moments", namely that of the dominant representations of the same, but shifting, relation in the Greek social system -namely the representations imposed by the shifting Greek nationalism. 2 In the next three sections, I will try to present the implications of the dominant nationalist discourse in every migratory period on the position(ality) (Harvey, 2001 ) of immigrants in the Greek city. To some extent, Soja's thesis about the nation-state as a product of the cities (2000) is inverted here, since cities are treated as products of nationalism. 3 For several reasons, some of which are illustrated below, I will use Salonica, the second largest city in Greece, as the major example. In the last section, I present a preliminary discussion concerning the future of the triangular relation city -immigration -nationalism, as it is implied by its present formative condition.
Greek nationalism did not remain invariable throughout the 20th century. Its content, its delimitations, what and who is included and excluded in the Greek national identity and its objectives, all changed several times, as it could be expected if we regard ethnic classifications as "social and cultural products related to the requirements of the classifiers" (Eriksen, 2002) . Moreover, it is because of this shifting character, implying a process rather than an object, that nationalism becomes a functional factor for the integration of immigrants to the city and consequently for urbanization. Very often, the seemingly everlasting and unifying idea of a "historically proved" national homogeneity overshadows the quality of nationalism as a dynamic process of collective identification. 4 160 2. The historical process of the formation of the Greek cities is a controversial issue. Despite several disagreements and different orientations there is almost a common acceptance of the context in which the whole discussion takes place, ranging from the peculiarities of capital accumulation in Greece (cf. Tsoukalas, 1987; Milios, 1988; Vaiou, Chadjimichalis, 1997) to the underdevelopment of the planning system (Economou, 1997) and from tolerated irregular appropriation of space (Leontidou, 1990) to familialism (Maloutas, 1990) and clientelism (Sakelaropoulos, 2001) as key components of the social reproduction system.
3. As a matter of fact, Soja himself provides the ground for such an inversion. While it was the demands of urban-industrial capitalism for the "development of new ways to keep [the] emerging industrialized space economy of urbanism together" (for "a new urban order"), that led to the homogenization of the imagined national community (2000: 77-8), it was due to the national reterritorialization that "subnational sources of power in cities were subordinated " (2000: 203) .
4. A comprehensive definition of nationalism is provided by Mouzelis (1994) , in his discussion of the relation between nationalism and modernity/modernization: "[Nationalism is] the massive mobilization and the integration of a population into a broader economic, political and cultural arena, usually called nation-state".
The historical stake of the (supposedly) undisturbed national homogeneity has imposed certain representations as well as diversity management policies, of the kind "we all are (or should be) Greeks". The basic hypothesis here is that this assimilating pattern is being challenged in the context of the new transnational immigration, leading to other forms of symbiosis, which do not take assimilation for granted. Furthermore, the replacement of the historical assimilative approach takes the form of an unprecedented ethnic hierarchy in respect to positions in the labour and housing markets, political participation and the rights to the city.
THE POST-WORLD WAR I PERIOD: HELLENIZATION AND MODERNIZATION; ASSIMILATION OR ABORTION
The end of the World War I, followed by the so-called Greek Asia Minor Catastrophe, brought about a crucial transformation of the foregoing model of external political relations, which was at the same time the dominant pattern of national development. The irredentist ideology known as the "Great Idea" was abandoned and the governments of that period adopted the objective of development inside the actually existing national borders (Milios, 1988) . While this shift was explicit regarding the country's foreign policy, its implications in the interior were much more ambiguous. Even if the modernization of the Greek social system figured at the top of the agenda for Liberal party's administration, the content of this modernization in respect to the social composition of the recently conquered "New Lands" and -especially in citieswas a controversial matter. The end of irredentism resulted to the final conflating of nation and state (Veremis, 1990) , but this shift had to go beyond the dominant ideological system to the actual practice of city life. 5 Not paradoxically, urban politics were found at the forefront of the modernization enterprise. The recently conquered cities of the "New Lands", and Salonica among them, constituted a privileged ground for urban planning, using contemporary trends and used as a pilot for other spatial arrangements elsewhere in Greece (Yerolympos, 1996) . As early as 1918, 161 5. As proved by Kitromilides (1990) , irredentism itself was not merely a plan of expansion of the Greek state, but also a strategy for the regulation of internal social relations. The exact content of the national identity had already changed during the irredentist era, according to political aspirations. Thus the abandonment of irredentism should not be seen as a transition from external to internal political priorities, but as a major shift in the social organization of Greece. only five years after the Greek conquest of Salonica, 6 the first ambitious master plan, worked out by the French architect E. Hébrard, was being prepared. The great fire in 1917 that destroyed a large part of the city center was in fact seen as an additional opportunity to treat urban space as an empty surface (Mazower, 2004) . The plan included several provisions aiming at the transition from a traditional Ottoman to a modern European city: land use zoning, widening of streets, rectangular plots, open spaces, establishment of a city university, regulation of architectural forms.
The rationalizing plan could not (and would not) ignore the extreme multi-ethnic composition of the city's population. In the aftermath of the establishment of the new Greek administration, the Greek population was only a minority, next to the greater groups, namely the Muslim and the Jewish communities and several minor others: Bulgarians, Serbs, Armenians, Caucasians and even people from European countries lived mainly in ethnically mixed neighborhoods (Moskof, 1978; Mazower, 2004) . After 1917 the poorer Jews in the city center had to cope with the disaster caused by the fire as well as the decision of the Greek administration to commodify their land (Yerolympos, 1996; Mazower, 2004) . But this was just one aspect of ethnic antagonism in that period.
If we leave aside the Bulgarian population, who suffered the consequences of Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan War and of Bulgarian claims in Macedonia, the new Greek administration did not intend to undertake any ethnic cleansing. On the contrary the will to respect all "races" under the protection of "a civilized state" (Mazower, 2004) was formally expressed. What dominated was rather the idea of a gradual hellenization of the city, as part of the whole modernization process. Thus, despite the competition with Jews and Muslims concerning land property and the appropriation of public spaces, the objective tended to be the confirmation of the predominance of the Greeks and the assimilation of others, especially the Jews 7 -or the containment of those others that seemed to be more culturally distant, namely the Muslim population. The assimilation pattern had already been or was going to be successful 162 6. Salonica was detached from the Ottoman Empire and incorporated in the Greek state in 1913, as a result of the Greek victory in the Balkan wars (1912) (1913) .
7. The historical Jewish community of Thessaloniki had been present in the city since the early 16th century. The Greek administration faced an internally divided Jewish community, as younger members felt more comfortable with the new order and the ongoing hellenization (Mazower, 2004; Margaritis, 2005 Lithoksoou, 1992; Milios, 1997; Divani, 1999) .
The short period of this kind of equilibrium in the balance of power between the main ethnic groups in Salonica ended suddenly when the ethnic engineering solution of population exchange was decided in order to finalize the conflict between Greece and Turkey, asserting the national character of both states. Until the beginning of 1925 almost all Muslims were forced to abandon the city, even though by a quite peaceful procedure (Mazower, 2004) . The arrival of the orthodox Christians had started earlier and had reached its peak just after the Asia Minor Catastrophe.
The settlement of some 100,000 Greek refugees in Salonica was an extremely hard task, as the 1917 fire and continuing migration had caused a permanent housing crisis in the city. But, this was only the more practical problem of their integration the question of their national identity was also a problem: many of them referred to themselves as "Anatolian Christian" rather than Greeks (Mazower, 2004) . Their assimilation in the dominant national narrative was not a self-evident process and has taken several decades.
In the remainder of the post World War I period, as the refugee issue was under a difficult but constant process of normalization, the ethnic balance of the city seemed to have been stabilized. The population composition had changed dramatically in a period not much longer than a decade. The Greeks had now been left with only one significant ethnically different neighbor in the city. As class divisions began to be more important than ethnic ones in a rapidly developing and spatially transformed city, ethnic diversity management appeared less often on the agenda. During the 1930s the Jewish community did not suffer mass violence, except in the case of a poor Jewish neighborhood in 1933. 8 It was the exceptional development of the labour movement and labour struggles, with its peak in 1936 (just before the imposition of the "4th of August" dictatorship), that became the characteristic of the city's social reality (Fountanopoulos, 2005) . Multi-ethnic participation in those struggles was an upsetting phenomenon for the police authorities, for it raised questions about the very control of urban space.
In the prelude to World War II, Salonica was a very different city from what it had been 30 years earlier. After all, it had become a Greek city. The 163 8. Anti-Semitism did appear in part of the local press, but was not incorporated in policy measures (Mazower, 2004) . construction of its "Greekness" was based on the assimilation of every ethnically different group and on the abortion of those that would not be assimilated. It was in general, despite some interesting exceptions and to some extent in contrast with what happened in the country, a quite temperate process of hellenization that treated the predominance of the Greek ethnic identity as a precondition for the assertion of the Greek state's sovereignty as well as its modernization.
THE POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD
The most significant direct consequence of the Word war II in Salonica was the massacre of its Jewish community in Nazi concentration camps, during the implementation of the "final solution". After the War, the decimated community faced several problems regarding its return and restoration in the city, while new refugees had arrived from the countryside and more would come during the Civil War that was about to break out. The centuries old co-existence of ethnically different populations was no longer a distinguishing feature of Salonica's everyday life.
The massive arrival of refugees, while conflicts still lasted, was only the prelude to the massive internal migration of the following decades. In the meanwhile, the successful assimilationism of the previous decades, that had left few not-integrated ethnic groups all over Greece 9 and the massive "disappearance" of Muslims and Jews from the city space, seemed to have turned ethnic diversity into a parochial issue. Ironically then, the ethnic identity -and in particular a highly politicized version of it-proved crucial for old and new residents in a turbulent period of rapid urbanization.
The post World War II period in Greece is an age of intense reactionary nationalism having few things in common with the modernizing nationalism of earlier decades (Tsoukalas, 1987) . A dichotomist rationale dominated in the organization of the authoritarian post-Civil War state dividing the 164 9. The largest of the historical ethnically different groups was and still is the Muslim Community in Western Thrace that was excepted from the population exchange in the 1920s. Despite several limitations and violations of rights in the past and the rejection of its Turkish selfidentification, its existence is formally recognized (Divani, 1999; Kourtovik, 1999) . On the contrary, the historical or contemporary existence of the ethnic minorities of Christian Slavs living in the Greek part of the Macedonian territory (Gounaris, 1997) and of Albanian-speaking Muslims in Epirus (Margaritis, 2005) were never recognized as such and are still formally neglected. population into patriots and betrayers. The defeated Left, individuals and whole families or sometimes even small village communities, had to face a long-lasting regime of persecutions, imprisonments, expulsions and executions (Dagas, 1995; Koundouros, 1978) ; but this was only the most obvious aspect of authoritarianism. Simultaneously, its direct spatial effect was the intensification of internal migratory movements, since in addition to economic collapse in rural areas, many people were searching for more secure life conditions in the anonymity of cities (Rokos, 1994) .
Indirect effects were perhaps even more permanent and influential. People on the move had to be nationally clear and consistent. An important part of the population was either excluded from or took less advantage of the clientelist networks that redistributed social positions in the urban space in a context of reduced active planning but of economic development and rapid urbanization. This exclusionary practice became formal, to some extent, as in the case of the Labor Housing Organization that predetermined the "national morale" as a sine qua non condition for its beneficiaries (Voivonda et al., 1977) .
Despite this forced absolute division, urban development and the amelioration of living conditions in the city was remarkable; from another point of view, however, it was this remarkable development that made the exclusion of those excluded even more offensive. Sooner or later, marginal settlement and very poor housing conditions for substantial parts of the urban population were eliminated. However, planning had little to do with this transition (Papamihos, Hastaoglou, 2000) . It was the intensive and expansive development of small landed property that constituted the main driving force, through informal, semi-formal or formal practices. 10 The reproductive rationale behind the "spontaneous" urbanization was summarized in a text written in 1952, at the beginning of the "Reconstruction" era, 11 presenting the advantages of the undertaking of a broad housing construction program. Although public housing represented a very limited part in the total housing production, similar benefits were expected from private unplanned housing restoration as well: 165 10. Tolerance against irregular housing, special housing loans to civil servants (while housing loans were in general prohibited), and antiparochi (a legal provision about the possibility of a land owner and a constructor to establish a joint venture for the construction of a single building that permitted the continuous exploitation of urban land by very small building enterprises) were some of the key elements of the land and housing system (Economou, 1988 (Economou, , 1997 (Economou, , 2000 .
11. The term "Reconstruction" summarized all the discussion and the uncertainties about the appropriate post-war development patterns in a context of contested sovereignty for the bourgeois state that led to particular choices (Delladetsimas, 2000) .
"From a social perspective, [a construction program] would be a further indication of the welfare state and of the state's interest in poor classes' fortune and would cause a timely damage to the communist aspirations in the country". 12 In the mid-1960s authoritarianism diminished temporarily, as political struggle developed in terms of volume and intensity. However, the new development of social movements hardly incorporated any demands concerning collective consumption in the city (Maloutas, 1986) . Even struggles about housing and settlement issues were rather related to the collective defense of individual practices and the individualized landed property, as in the typical case of irregular construction in Salonica and elsewhere.
In any case, it was after the dictatorship of 1967-1974 that authoritarianism would come to an end, almost thirty years after the end of World War II, also bringing about the end of the uncontested domination of reactionary nationalism. In the meanwhile, the rapid post-war urban development had already uncovered its deficiencies. But, apart from the sporadic survival of reactionary ideas and attitudes, how was nationalism restructured in the following years? I argue that we can find some important and relevant elements in the emerging representations regarding the new transnational immigrants in the Greek city.
THE PERIOD OF TRANSNATIONAL IMMIGRATION: EMERGENCE OF AN ETHNIC HIERARCHY
About seventy years after the end of the multi-ethnic Salonica, the city started once again to resemble that of the early 20th century, in an unexpected and fragmented way. It would be rather naive to talk about some kind of continuity in multiculturalism, since that different past had already been removed not only from everyday lives, but also from most of the individual and collective memories. Moreover, what differentiates modern transnationalism 13 from older forms of urban otherness is the common feeling that these new residents do not belong (yet?) to the city. 12. Varvaresos, 1952 , cited by Delladetsimas, 1994 . Transnationalism has been suggested as a concept that captures the re-articulation of belonging in the globalization age (Portes et al., 1999; Westwood, Phizaklea, 2000) . For the first time in modern history, new immigrants in Greek cities do not confront a pattern of assimilation while they commence their new urban life-courses. Assimilation is no more a prerequisite as new immigrants, regardless where they come from, are not supposed nor expected to have or acquire a Greek national conscience. During the 1990s, a new managerial concept, that of integration, has appeared in the political agenda and, more recently, in the legal documents as well.
There are several fields of immigrants' social life in which one can trace this shift. One aspect of hierarchy could lie in the empirical evidence about inequalities between members of different ethnic groups, the dominant one included. The existence of inequalities can be for the moment '"proved" by available statistical data regarding various matters from salaries to working conditions and from housing to consumption patterns (Lianos et al., 1998; Lazaridis and Psimenos, 2001; Cavounidis, 2002; Hatziprokopiou, 2004; Psimenos, 2004; Kandylis, 2005) . However interesting these findings may be, and however unequal positions they may (and do) indicate, they are not sufficient to support the hierarchy argument. Ethnic hierarchy should be seen as an emerging process rather than an objective situation, in the same way that assimilation was a process of gradual identification with a common national narrative. Consequently, indices about the building of hierarchies should be sought in those processes that tend to define the context in which immigration is being represented and managed.
Legal aspects of this context have already been transformed in the short period since the beginning of the massive arrival of "foreigners" in the early 1990s. The traditional assimilationist Law of 1929 was replaced in 1991, when the need for such a replacement was officially admitted, but other three general Laws and some important Ministerial Decisions followed. The general tendency, about which there seems to be a general consensus, is to treat the contemporary migratory movements as carriers of labour force. In 1991 the political agenda was almost limited to a mere rejection of migration (Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2001) . Border controls and the restriction of new arrivals constituted the first reaction. A shift towards the regulation of immigrant labour has occurred thereafter, mainly through the legalization of irregular immigrants. The recently adopted Law 3386/2005 makes explicit mention of integration, although this general objective is not yet implemented through specific measures (Kapsalis, 2005) .
The various procedures for obtaining a legal status in Greece lead to differentiated conditions of residence and work. As a matter of fact, legalization procedures, with strict conditions in terms of presence in the country and important money requirements, 14 have led to the constant reproduction of irregular labour (Marvakis, 2004; Ventoura, 2004) , as many foreign workers move periodically from legal to "illegal" status and vice versa, being unable to fulfill the criteria. This is not the case for immigrants of Greek origin, coming from the countries of the former Soviet Union. Based on their Greek ethnic identity, which is formally recognized as such in Greece under the term homogeneis, they are able to claim and obtain permanent residence and even Greek citizenship (cf. Pavlou, undated) . On the contrary, the citizenship option is not a feasible opportunity for non-ethnic Greeks, as they have to wait for at least twelve years without any formal guarantee that their demand will eventually be satisfied (cf. Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky, 1999) . Moreover, claiming full citizenship is not an actual option for immigrants of Greek origin coming from other countries, especially Albania, where a significant Greek minority is still present. Access to full citizenship for them comes through naturalization, as for other foreigners. While a special Law has been enacted regarding the restoration and integration of "repatriated" immigrants from the former Soviet Union, poor legal provisions have been established for those from Albania, who are in general expected to stay in their homeland, mainly due to foreign policy priorities. 15 Differentiations in legal provisions allow for the divergent representation of various categories of the incoming population. "Repatriated" Greeks are primarily characterized by their ethnic origin, as the very term indicates for people who by and large have never been in Greece before. They seem to be here because "they belong here". Their rights in the city are being regulated following this special condition, as it is reflected on several provisions concerning their housing. On the other hand, foreign immigrants' presence seems to depend directly on their work. Their regular presence presupposes some employment relation, justified by some respective need of the internal labour market. Once this relation is over, they are normally supposed to leave. They seem to be here because "they need to be here" and, almost accidentally, their presence may be beneficial for "both parts". Instead of a right to work their life-courses are determined by an obligation to work. 168 14. The first Legalization operation was launched in 1997. Since then an almost continuous procedure has been established, with successive deadlines, but failing to definitely legalize all irregular immigrants (Cavounidis, 2002 (Cavounidis, , 2003 Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2001) .
15. See Pavlou, undated. This regime of differential opportunities for immigrants of Greek origin from different countries has been criticized by the Greek Ombudsman in several reports (see www.sinigoros.gr). Another important dimension of the emerging migratory regime has to do with the persistent effort to supervise and control migratory movements in an actually compex situation of irregular arrivals, facilitated by the extent and pattern of the Greek borderland. An ad hoc police agency, responsible for the control of the borders, was founded in the early 1990s but the police jurisdiction on migration policies has gone much further. As a matter of fact, the borderline has moved to the interior of the country and to urban space. Police supervision of foreign immigrants' everyday space includes several occasions of mass expulsions, especially of Albanian citizens, and a greater number of rights' violations, either ordinary or exceptional and violent ones (Kourtovik, 2001) .
However influential this regime of suppression may be on immigrants' everydayness, it does not imply a general decision to force them to leave. Displacement could not be and, more importantly, is not the dominant organizing principle of the contemporary migratory policy. Instead, immigrants are either "here to stay", if they share common national narratives with the dominant indigenous national group, or "here in any case", if they are ethnically different. In the latter case, some widespread negative representations happen to accompany specific ethnic groups, the Albanians being the most obvious one, while others are being thought of in less negative, neutral or even positive terms. I do not argue that we could shape a sort of a classificatory list about ethnic hierarchy merely by measuring the negative attitudes. Negative feelings may easily change through time and occasionally by the projection of certain events in public discourses (Pavlou, 2001) . But what seems important here is the differential attribution of rights according to ethnic origin.
CONCLUSIONS
The history of Greek nationalism in 20th century Greece, only roughly discussed in this paper, is characterized by distinctive phases of definitions and objectives, combining elements of modernization and reactionism. Despite the quite wide spectrum of these transformations, nationalism's implications on how incoming people have been treated in different periods could be summarized in the assimilation -exclusion dualism, with its ethnic and (thus) political criteria. New transnational immigration to Greece is far from creating transnational representations in the city, which means is far from enriching nationalism with transnationalism.
What is "new" in the current period of transnational immigration in Greek cities does not simply concern the socio-spatial symbiosis of ethnically different groups recognized as such. At least for a short period in the post-World War I period, ethnic diversity was as impressive as its subsequent fading. But the modernizing nationalism of that time imposed a large project of assimilation which, assisted by the great events that followed and later by the artificial nationalist division, left few "others" in the cities, obliged not to celebrate their otherness.
Nowadays, otherness is here to stay, but as a problematic social reality (Marvakis et al., 2001) . New immigrants are not supposed to be incorporated in a way that ignores their ethnic heritage. On the contrary, otherness is in general tolerated and the Greek city proved to have much space "left" for new immigrants. However, this space tends to be what its name implies. As "left for others", it is a hierarchical space with a differential structure of rights and opportunities. The contemporary situation of nationalism in Greece allows for the integration of others, recognizing their otherness as such but not feeling very comfortable with their rights to the city. The imagined temporary character of migration at the individual level is restricted to presence rather than participation.
In any case, the shift towards a tolerant nationalism constitutes a remarkable new evolution. Whether this leads to the perception of a transnational social environment or to dominant representations of tolerated coexistence through subordination is a stake for the future. To put it differently, one could not merely argue about the lack of recognition. The dilemma of recognition policy is, as has been in other migratory regimes, between a closed homogeneous and an open heterogeneous system (Wallman, 1998; Eriksen, 2002) . The transformations of Greek nationalism and of its implications on the relation between immigrants and the city, however important, do not yet tend to the latter choice. Greek nationalism is still related to exclusionary identities and practices (Ventoura, 2004 , Maloutas et al., 2007 . Transnational realities do not yet meet transnational representations.
In a very brief presentation, table 1 summarizes the different phases of the relation between nationalism and urbanization and the relevant mixture of different dominant patterns of "incorporating" immigrants. What should be clear is that every phase was/is formed through processes of transition that depend on previous ones. In general, the shift towards more tolerance plus more hierarchy raises the question about how this transition was made possible. One of the elements of possible answers concerns of course the changing possibilities provided by the historical formation of urban space, leading once again to Soja's thesis about nationalism as a product of cities. Transformations of nationalism could be seen as products of urbanization as well, but as a product of cities that incorporate previous nationalist representations. 
